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INTRODUCTION
For major financial trading firms, the money is not really in the stocks
they trade; it is in the methods they have developed to trade them. In 2008,
financial firms generated an estimated $21 billion in profits from highfrequency trading (HFT).1 HFT utilizes computers, operating under the
control of complex algorithms, to mine dozens of marketplaces for
information, while simultaneously executing purchase and sale orders.2
These computers are able to spot trends, analyze information, and place
millions of orders in fractions of a second, giving them a distinct advantage
over human traders and slower computers.3 The algorithms that control the
computers are the geese that lay many of Wall Street’s golden eggs, and
their development and confidentiality are vital to the success of HFT firms.4
One of the biggest firms using HFT is Goldman Sachs.5 Goldman
understands the value of its algorithms, richly compensating the employees
who develop them. In 2009, Sergey Aleynikov was programming HFT
code for Goldman and making $400,000 a year.6 In return, Aleynikov
agreed to Goldman’s confidentiality policy that made clear that his work
was the intellectual property of the firm, required him to keep all
proprietary information in confidence, and barred him from taking any
information or using it when his employment ended.7
In April 2009, a start-up firm called Teza Technologies was attempting
to develop its own HFT system and offered Aleynikov more than $1 million
per year to develop part of its algorithm.8 Teza let Aleynikov know that it
was expecting the system to be developed far faster than usual.9 Aleynikov
accepted Teza’s offer and set his last day at Goldman for June 5, 2009.10 In
a scene reminiscent of spy capers, at 5:20 p.m. that day—just before his
going away party—Aleynikov went to his office, secretly encrypted more
than 500,000 lines of Goldman’s HFT source code, and uploaded the code
to a foreign server.11 He then deleted the encryption program and tried to

1

Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, In Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2009, at A1.
2
See id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2012).
7
See United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
8
Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 74.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
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erase the history of his computer commands.12 Later that evening, he
downloaded the source code to his home computer and copied some of the
files to other computers.13 On July 2, Aleynikov flew to Chicago to attend
meetings at Teza and brought a flash drive and laptop containing portions
of Goldman’s HFT code.14
Aleynikov was arrested by federal agents when he arrived home from
those meetings.15 He was charged with one count each of violating the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Economic Espionage Act
(EEA), and the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).16 The district court
dismissed the CFAA count before trial, but Aleynikov was ultimately tried
and convicted under the EEA and the NSPA counts.17 However, on April
11, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
overturned both convictions on Aleynikov’s appeal.18
The NSPA makes it a crime to “transport[ ], transmit[ ], or transfer[ ]
in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities
or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been
stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”19 The question before the Second
Circuit regarding the NSPA was whether the algorithm constituted a “good,
ware, or merchandise.”20 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Second
Circuit concluded that the code did not qualify because “[s]ome tangible
property must be taken from the owner for there to be deemed a ‘good’ that
is ‘stolen’ for purposes of the NSPA.”21 Since the HFT code was intangible
property, the court reversed Aleynikov’s NSPA conviction.22
The EEA conviction appeal also centered on the nature of the HFT
code. Here, the Second Circuit asked whether the HFT code was either
“produced for” or “placed in” commerce.23 The district court had ruled that
the HFT code was “produced for” commerce because Goldman used it to
execute trades.24 The Second Circuit ruled that because Goldman had no
intention of selling or licensing its system to anyone, however, the code

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 74–75.
Id. at 75.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
See Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 79.
United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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itself was not a product produced for commerce.25 Indeed, the court noted
that Goldman went to “great lengths” to maintain the code’s secrecy, as
Goldman’s profits “depended on no one else having” the code. 26 Thus, the
very attribute that made the theft damaging to Goldman—that the value of
the source code depended on confidentiality—meant that Aleynikov’s theft
was not a violation of the EEA.
HFT systems are valuable because they confer traders an advantage
over competitors who are not using them.27 If another firm can gather the
same information and make the same trades at the same frequency, the
value of Goldman’s system is reduced. Such loss is the reason why
prosecutors tried to fit three different statutes to Aleynikov’s actions. The
EEA and NSPA counts’ failures illustrate a point that underlies this
Comment: traditional statutory regimes are, at times, inadequate to address
certain criminal acts presented in the digital age.
This Comment argues that Aleynikov’s theft should constitute a
violation of federal law, but not the NSPA or EEA. Rather, this Comment
focuses on the third statute Aleynikov was originally charged with
violating, one specifically enacted to address digital age crimes: the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). In dismissing the CFAA count,
the district court looked to persuasive authority that held that the CFAA is
only violated when computer users access information that they do not have
permission to access for any purpose.28 Such precedent represents a CFAA
narrow interpretation, which developed in response to other cases that
applied a broad interpretation.29 Those cases held that the CFAA implicitly
contained use restrictions, meaning that improper information use could
violate the statute.30 The narrow interpretation adopted in the Aleynikov

25

Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 82.
Id.
27
See Duhigg, supra note 1.
28
See Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581
F.3d 1127, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2009); Univ. Sports Pub. Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F.
Supp. 2d 378, 382–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692
F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jet One Grp., Inc. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., No.
08-CV-3980 (JS) (ETB), 2009 WL 2524864, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009)).
29 For circuits that have followed the broad interpretation, see United States v. John, 597
F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th
Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 2001);
see also infra Part III.A & B.
30
See, e.g., Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21; EF Cultural, 274 F.3d at 582; NCMIC Fin. Corp.
v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1056 (S.D. Iowa 2009); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v.
Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
26
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trial court criticized these “broad interpretation” or “use restrictions”
approaches as overly broad with little textual grounding.31
Those criticisms have merit, but the narrow interpretation adopted in
Aleynikov is also flawed. It renders the CFAA ineffective when employees
misappropriate data. This Comment advances a novel interpretation of the
CFAA, which would impose liability for employee data theft while
avoiding the pitfalls of overbreadth that plague the current broad
interpretations.
Part I of this Comment gives a brief background of computer crime,
computer misuse statutes, and the CFAA. Part II discusses CFAA
provisions that are relevant to employee data theft. Part III provides a
summary of the current circuit split regarding insider theft under the CFAA,
the split between the narrow and broad interpretation theories. Part IV
argues that insider theft should be prohibited by federal law generally and
the CFAA specifically, but acknowledges the validity of critiques of the
CFAA’s current broad interpretation. Finally, Part V advances a new
CFAA interpretation that brings insider data theft within the scope of the
statute, while eliminating concerns about overbreadth.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DIGITAL THEFT
A. A RISING PROBLEM

It is a truism that computer technology occupies a central place in
modern business. It is not just digital communication that is pervasive;
businesses have largely discarded paper and boxes for hard drives and
servers as the preferred means of storing information. And with the advent
of mobile devices (flash drives, laptops, smart phones, etc.) employees can
access and transmit electronic data with ease. Given the concurrent
dependence on digital storage and ease in digital transmission, it may be no
surprise that data theft is a rising problem for businesses.32 In fact, many
data thieves are in positions similar to Sergey Aleynikov: members of a
company’s management with the ability to take electronic files as they
prepare to leave the company (or even after they have left).33
A study conducted by accounting and consulting firm KPMG showed
that between 2006 and 2008, cases of employee-related data theft more than

31

Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 193–94.
See Pamela Taylor, Comment, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 205–06 (2012).
33
See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Electronic Data Theft More Prevalent than Physical Thefts:
Survey, EWEEK (Oct. 18, 2010), http://goo.gl/IjaeGr.
32
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doubled.34 In roughly 70% of those thefts, the employees moved to a rival
company, and a substantial number of thieves used stolen data to start
competing businesses themselves.35 The KPMG study predicted that the
number of such insider thefts was “almost certain” to increase further,36 and
a 2010 report on trends in international fraud validated that prediction.37 In
that survey, businesses reported that electronic data thefts outnumbered
tangible property thefts and that financial losses from data theft were
greater than losses from physical thefts of cash, assets, and inventory.38
The firms most threatened by the rise in data theft are those in
“information-rich industries” such as financial services, professional
services, technology, and communications.39 These industries both depend
most on proprietary information and are plagued by the highest levels of
electronic theft. Damage from data theft is not limited to the monetary
value of the information; there is a “risk of reputational damage if your firm
loses customer data. That itself could be an existential threat to your
business.”40 Disturbingly, firms are not well protected against such threats,
as surveys of employees show many believe that digital theft is common
and can be committed with relative impunity.41
B. COMPUTER MISUSE STATUTES AS POTENTIAL REMEDIES

The rise of computer-related crimes was not unanticipated. Starting in
the late 1970s, states enacted legislation to combat computer misuse that
was not effectively addressed by preexisting law.42 Abuses such as
hacking, distribution of deleterious programming code, denial-of-service
attacks, and theft of digital information were not adequately covered by
existing law. Trespass and burglary laws, for example, were generally too
tied to the physical world, while theft laws were too dependent on true
owners being deprived of their property interest.43
34
Leslie Paul Machado, Protecting Against Employee Theft, HUMAN RES. EXEC. ONLINE
(July 12, 2010), http://goo.gl/Nh53zc (citing a 2009 KPMG study).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See Rashid, supra note 33.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. (quoting Tommy Helsby, Kroll chairman for Europe, Middle East, and Africa).
41
See Taylor, supra note 32, at 206.
42
Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1602–15 (2003); see also Katherine
Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees’ Authorization
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 835–36 (2009) (citing
Kerr, supra, at 1602–07).
43
Field, supra note 42, at 835 n.102, 835–36.
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As one commenter described it, “[c]omputer-related criminal conduct
presents a challenge . . . because it involves electronic impulses that cannot
be seen, touched, moved, or copied as those terms have traditionally been
defined, and that therefore seem to fall outside the idea of ‘property’ as
defined over centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence.”44 This is
because “[l]arceny and theft statutes typically require proof that the
defendant exercised unauthorized control over the property of another with
the intent to deprive the other of all or part of its value.”45
This problem manifested itself in the case of Lund v. Commonwealth,
in which the Virginia Supreme Court held that unauthorized use of a
computer could not be prosecuted under a larceny statute.46 Specifically,
the court held that “[a]t common law, larceny is the taking and carrying
away of the goods and chattels of another with intent to deprive the owner
of the possession thereof permanently.”47 Because the computer owner was
not deprived of possession, the larceny statute was inapplicable.48 The
Aleynikov case provides a more recent example of this dilemma, with the
Second Circuit holding the NSPA inapplicable to intangible property, such
as the stolen source code.49
But states were not alone in enacting computer misuse laws. The U.S.
Congress also enacted a new, specific computer crime statute. The CFAA50
was Congress’s first federal computer crime law.51 Enacted in 1984,
Congress updated it in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2001, and 2008.52
II. THE CFAA STATUTE
The CFAA section most relevant to employee theft of digital
information is 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), which holds as criminally liable
those who “intentionally access[] a computer without authorization or
exceed[] authorized access, and thereby obtain[] . . . information from any

44

Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <Ctrl><Alt><Del>: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime
Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 574, 577 (1997).
45
Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 BUS.
LAW. 1395, 1400 (2007).
46
232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (Va. 1977).
47
Id.
48
See id.
49
See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2012).
50
See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1598 n.11 (explaining that the name “Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act” technically refers only to the 1986 amendments to the statute, but that in practice
both courts and commentators use the name and its acronym for the entire statute).
51
Id. at 1615.
52
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); Kerr, supra note 42, at 1615.
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protected computer.”53 Violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C) is a misdemeanor
unless it is committed “for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain,”54 in furtherance of any “criminal or tortious act,”55 or if the
value of information obtained is greater than $5,000.56
Also relevant is § 1030(g), which creates a civil remedy for some
victims of CFAA violations.57 Consequently, much of the case law
regarding § 1030(a)(2)(C) interpretation has occurred in civil cases.
Subsequent criminal cases have not distinguished between statutory CFAA
interpretations in criminal and civil contexts.58 Thus, this Comment relies
on both civil and criminal CFAA cases’ interpretive developments.
The statute also defines a number of terms, and two definitions are
particularly pertinent. “Protected computer” is defined as a computer
“which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication, including a computer located outside the United States that
is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or
communication of the United States.”59 That broad definition means that
“protected computer” effectively encompasses any computer connected to
the Internet.60
The second term, and the most significant one for this Comment, is the
phrase “exceeds authorized access,” which the statute defines as “to access
a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or
alter.”61 This provision applies to “insider” situations, such as employee
data theft.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING CFAA’S REACH
In deciding cases of employee digital theft, courts have focused on the
word “authorized” in “exceeded authorized access.”62
Two main
53

Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i).
55 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).
56
Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii).
57
Id. § 1030(g).
58
See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing as
authoritative the CFAA interpretations from the civil case LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka,
581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009)).
59
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
60
See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1663.
61
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(6).
62
See, e.g., Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129 (“We affirm. Because [Christopher] Brekka was
authorized to use LVRC’s computers while he was employed at LVRC, he did not access a
computer ‘without authorization’ . . . .”); NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1056 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“The issue for the Court to decide is whether an employee
54
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interpretation branches of that word have emerged: broad interpretation,
which has led to findings of liability, and narrow interpretation, which has
led to employees being held not liable in civil cases or not guilty in criminal
cases.63 The broad interpretations impose restrictions on how insiders use
information,64 while the narrow theory ignores use and focuses solely on
whether the insider has permission to view data.
Two main theories have emerged to justify a broad interpretation:
agency theory and contract theory.65 Instead of defining “authorized
access” by whether someone has permission to access information, these
theories look to their duties and responsibilities relating to access. Courts
derive these duties from other legal principles, namely the law of agency
and contract.66
A. BROAD INTERPRETATION THROUGH AGENCY THEORY

The agency approach asserts that in the employer–employee context,
“authorized access” is governed by the same law that governs the
employer–employee relationship: the law of agency.67 The theory
specifically focuses on the duty of loyalty that employees owe employers.68
That duty requires employees to act solely for the benefit of their employer
and, most relevantly, means that an employee’s authority to act for the
employer is terminated when “without knowledge of the principal, he
acquires adverse interests or is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of

may act ‘without authorization’ or ‘exceeds authorized access’ when he accesses
confidential and proprietary business information . . . that he has permission to access, but
then uses that information in a manner inconsistent with the employer’s interest or in
violation of other contractual obligations . . . .”).
63
Compare Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006)
(imposing liability when an employee used information that he otherwise had permission to
access for work purposes), with Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129 (refusing to impose liability when
an employee used information that he otherwise had permission to access for work
purposes).
64
See, e.g., Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420; EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d
577, 582 (1st Cir. 2001) (imposing liability when an employee provided confidential
information to a competitor); Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1058–59 (imposing liability when a
company vice president accessed the company’s customer list and e-mailed it to himself for
use in future competition).
65
See Field, supra note 42, at 822–23.
66
See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21 (evaluating authority using principles of agency law);
Explorica, 274 F.3d at 582 (evaluating authority through the lens of contract law using a
confidentiality agreement).
67
See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1633–34.
68
Id.
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loyalty to the principal.”69 In the employer–employee context, the duty of
loyalty is breached at the moment the employee resolves to compete with or
otherwise harm the employer.70 In the context of the CFAA, then, this
theory means that authorization to access any information is implicitly
revoked by the employee’s breach of the duty of loyalty.71 Consequently,
even if an employee has permission to access information for work
purposes, he still violates the CFAA by accessing such information with an
intent that violates the duty of loyalty.
The Seventh Circuit adopted this interpretation in International
Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin.72 In that case, an employee deleted all of
the data on one of his employer’s laptops.73 The employee had permission
to access the computer and the specific data for work purposes.74 The court
held that when the employee resolved to destroy the files, however, he
breached his duty of loyalty, which implicitly revoked his permission to
access the data.75 The CFAA claim against him therefore survived a motion
to dismiss.76 In a different case, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington held that defendants stated a sufficient CFAA claim
against an employee who e-mailed confidential information to a competitor
when he was preparing to jump ship.77 The employee had allegedly
breached his duty of loyalty and therefore would be unauthorized to access
the information.78
The agency approach’s broad scope means it can be said to be the most
employer-friendly approach, as simply acquiring interests adverse to the
employer can revoke authorization and result in liability.79 Accordingly,
69

See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (quoting State v. DiGiulio, 835 P.2d 488, 492 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958)).
70
See id. at 420–21 (holding that authority to access information ends when an employee
acquires adverse interests).
71
See Field, supra note 42, at 823.(citing Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self
Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000)).
72
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21.
73
Id. at 419.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 420 (“For his authorization to access the laptop terminated when . . . he resolved
to destroy files that incriminated himself and other files that were also the property of his
employer, in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes on an employee.”).
76
See id. at 420–21.
77 See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1123, 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
78
Id. at 1125 (“[T]he authority of the plaintiff’s former employees ended when they
allegedly became agents of the defendant.”).
79
See Field, supra note 42, at 824 (calling the agency theory “undoubtedly the most
employer-favorable approach, since simply characterizing the employee’s actions as against
the employer’s interests will likely result in liability”).
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this theory ensures that virtually any fact pattern involving “insider” digital
theft results in liability under the CFAA.80
B. BROAD INTERPRETATION THROUGH CONTRACT THEORY

Other courts have looked to the law of contracts to define the scope of
“authorization” under the CFAA. This approach looks at explicit terms of
employment (e.g., employment agreements, employee handbooks,
published policies) to define what access is authorized.81 In one case
applying contract theory, EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica Inc., former
employees provided information to their former employer’s competitor.82
The First Circuit looked to those employees’ employment contracts and
determined that their disclosure likely violated a confidentiality provision
therein.83 Because the contract governed the scope of the authorization to
access information, the First Circuit reasoned that if the defendant’s
allegations were proven, the employees violated the agreement and
exceeded authorization, making them potentially liable under the CFAA.84
In United States v. Czubinski, the First Circuit employed similar
reasoning by examining an employee handbook signed by an IRS
employee.85 The handbook rules of conduct limited computer access to
“only those accounts required to accomplish . . . official duties.”86 The
court determined that the IRS employee exceeded his authorized access
under the CFAA when he browsed acquaintances’ tax returns, even if the
defendant did not obtain anything “of value” to sustain a conviction under
the specific subpart.87
This contract-based approach has the advantage of expressly
delineating what access is or is not permitted for each individual. It also
allows some flexibility, as prohibited conduct adjusts to the terms of the
contract, and employers can adjust for more or less leeway for their
employees’ access to information depending on the sensitivity of
information or other considerations.

80
Kerr, supra note 42, at 1634 (declaring that “the apparent effect of Shurgard is to
criminalize an employee’s use of an employer’s computer for anything other than workrelated activities”).
81
Field, supra note 42, at 827 (“The contract-based interpretation requires the computer
user to violate a contract before that user’s access can be found to be unauthorized.”).
82
274 F.3d 577, 579–80 (1st Cir. 2001).
83
Id. at 583–84.
84
Id. at 583.
85
See 106 F.3d 1069, 1071 (1st Cir. 1997).
86
Id. at 1071 n.1.
87
See id. at 1078 (reversing Richard Czubinksi’s conviction but finding that he
“unquestionably exceeded authorized access to a Federal interest computer”).
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C. NARROW INTERPRETATION

The narrow interpretation of the CFAA arose as a response to the
broad theories. Courts were worried that those theories rely heavily on
principles extrinsic to the statute, conflate statutory terms, and could
encompass acts that Congress did not intend the CFAA to address.88
Because of those worries, courts developed the narrow theory, claiming that
it focused on a plain language reading of the statute and the word
“authorized.”89
The first court to develop such a theory was the Ninth Circuit in LVRC
Holdings LLC v. Brekka.90 In Brekka, an employer sued its former
employee under the CFAA after the employee e-mailed data to himself and
then used that data to compete with his former employer.91 The district
court had held that because the employee had permission to access the
information, he could not be liable under the CFAA, and the appellate court
upheld the district court’s narrow reading of the statute.92 Brekka stressed
that the term “authorization” has no technical or ambiguous meaning, and
that the dictionary definition should govern.93 The Ninth Circuit looked to
the plain language in reducing the question to whether an employer gave the
employee permission to access specific information and, if access had been
granted, no violation could occur.94 Thus, if a person was granted access to
a customer list for a specific purpose, for instance, he could not be
prosecuted under the CFAA for any action taken regarding that customer
list, regardless of the action.
Under this interpretation, courts do not analyze use (or misuse), but
rather only ask whether the employee was allowed to access the information
in the course of employment.95 This inquiry limits the application of
“exceeding authorized access” only to those situations where an employee
has authorization to access a computer but then “hacks” into information he

88

United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (discussing
“innocuous” acts that broad CFAA interpretations would criminalize).
89
See, e.g., id. at 863; LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.
2009).
90
Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127.
91
See id. at 112930.
92
See id. at 1132, 1137.
93
Id. at 1133 (citing RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2001) and adopting
its definition of “authorization” as persuasive in defining “exceeds authorized access”)
94
See id.
95
See Field, supra note 42, at 825 (explaining that “where an employee has been
affirmatively granted the ability to use and access a computer database or system, his
authorization cannot be challenged under the code-based interpretation”).
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does not have permission to access.96 For example, an employee might use
the computer he is allowed to use to access an encrypted file on the
employer network that he is not allowed to access.97
This narrow type of analysis is also exemplified in the criminal case
United States v. Nosal.98 In Nosal, a former employee who had set up a
competing company convinced some of his former colleagues to use their
access to obtain data from a confidential database.99 The district court
originally held Nosal liable under the CFAA by applying a broad
interpretation.100 After Brekka, Nosal moved for, and was granted,
reconsideration of its motion to dismiss.101 The district court then granted
dismissal, as Brekka explicitly rejected the broad-interpretation reasoning
that supported the court’s original denial.102 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.103 The former colleagues, as current employees, were allowed by
their employer to access the information as part of their jobs.104 According
to the court, because the current employees were allowed to access the
information, the CFAA did not make them liable for sending Nosal the
data.105
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ FLAWED APPROACHES
For a variety of reasons, the CFAA should be interpreted as extending
liability to insider theft of digital information. Policy justifications, in the
form of the rising danger of digital theft, privacy concerns, and the nature of
the Internet, support the need for a federal statute criminalizing insider
digital information theft. Further, the CFAA’s history indicates that it was
indeed intended to extend liability to such crimes. Finally, the statutory
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See id.
Kerr, supra note 42, at 1604 (“For example, a person can hack into a corporate
network and see secret files that the person is not supposed to view. In such a case, the
hacker will have exceeded her privileges on the network; she will see more than the network
was configured to allow her to view.”).
98
676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
99
Id. at 856.
100
See United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 13, 2009).
101
See United States v. Nosal, No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6,
2010).
102
See id. at *5–6.
103 Nosal, 676 F.3d 863.
104 Id. at 864.
105
Id. at 863 (“For our part, we continue to follow in the path blazed by Brekka and the
growing number of courts that have reached the same conclusion. These courts recognize
that the plain language of the CFAA ‘target[s] the unauthorized procurement or alteration of
information, not its misuse or misappropriation.’” (citations omitted)).
97

618

KEVIN JAKOPCHEK

[Vol. 104

language itself, particularly the express statutory definition of “exceeds
authorized access” supports liability and cannot be construed consistently
with the narrow interpretations. However, the current forms of the broad
interpretations are also unworkable due to the overbreadth of what they
criminalize. Thus, this Comment advances a third theory, consistent with
congressional intent, which would criminalize insider data theft without the
overreach of the current broad interpretations.
A. POLICY CONCERNS JUSTIFY A FEDERAL PROHIBITION ON INSIDER
DIGITAL INFORMATION THEFT

Three policy concerns support extending liability to insider digital
information theft through a federal law. First, the growing harms of digital
theft warrant additional protection. Second, such liability will help to
protect the privacy interests of third parties whose concerns may not be
adequately internalized by the companies that possess their data. Third, the
federal government is better situated to police digital theft than the states.
As discussed, digital theft is a present and growing problem for
businesses, now costing companies more than theft of physical objects.106
Further, the ease of transmitting digital information leaves employees with
a sense of invulnerability when it comes to committing digital theft.107 The
CFAA’s dual criminal and civil nature provides the deterrent effect
traditionally associated with criminal prohibition, and the civil provisions
allow businesses the opportunity to seek restitution. Indeed, the significant
dangers presented by digital theft have influenced judicial decisions in both
Australia and England to extend laws against unauthorized access to also
proscribe access for unauthorized purposes.108
Another policy rationale is that criminalization of digital theft protects
third-party privacy.109 Third parties, such as customers and clients, may
provide firms with personal information that those firms use in the course
of business for tasks, such as marketing. Many of the privacy-related
concerns may not be sufficiently internalized to firms and their data security
policies and procedures.110 That is to say, those who bear the social costs of
privacy breaches, the data subjects, do not have control over the security
106

See supra note 34–38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
108
See, e.g., R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Gov’t of the United
States, [2000] 2 UKHL 216 (interpreting U.K. Computer Misuse Act similarly); DPP (Vic) v
Murdoch, [1993] 1 VR 406, 40911 (Austl.) (interpreting State of Victoria Computer
Trespass Act to apply to a bank employee).
109
Winn, supra note 45, at 1420–22 (explaining that criminalization would protect thirdparty privacy in a discussion of the pros and cons of a criminalization scheme).
110
Id. at 1420.
107
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measures adopted by those who aggregate the data. In these instances,
criminalization may provide a deterrent effect to protect third-party privacy
that would otherwise be absent in a scheme that only provided for civil
recourse or no recourse at all.
One instance in which the CFAA served this purpose was the case
United States v. Rodriguez.111 In that case, a Social Security Administration
(SSA) agent used the SSA database to obtain information about female
acquaintances, including his ex-wife, his former girlfriend, his former
colleague’s daughter, and a waitress who worked at a restaurant he
frequently visited, among others.112 The SSA had a computer-use policy,
reinforced through training, which instructed employees that access to
database information was only allowed for legitimate business purposes. 113
Even though Roberto Rodriguez refused to sign annual forms
acknowledging that he received the polices in writing, 114 the court noted
that the SSA still told Rodriguez he was not authorized “to obtain personal
information for nonbusiness reasons.”115 Applying contract theory, the
Eleventh Circuit held that Rodriguez had exceeded his authorized access
when he perused the information for personal gain and was guilty of a
CFAA violation.116
A second rationale for federal criminal liability is that the nature of
digital theft requires regulation by federal authorities, as opposed to
regulation by states. One issue relates to jurisdiction. Consider, for
instance, a hypothetical situation involving an employee who works in
California for a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place
of business in New York. The employee downloads information stored on
servers in Illinois, and then uploads that information to a competitor based
in Florida. Which state’s digital theft law shall apply? The application of
federal law not only eliminates complex jurisdictional and choice-of-law
questions for the courts; it also provides clearer guidance for citizens
regarding prohibited conduct.
Second, coupling the geographically
dispersed nature of computer crime and the fact that one goal of the CFAA
it to provide a civil recourse, a national statute would facilitate plaintiffs’
pursuit of remedies. Finally, given the possibility of such diffuse
111

628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Andrew T. Hernacki, Note, A Vague Law in
a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543, 155657 (2012) (discussing Rodriguez’s
application to theft of third-party information).
112 Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260–62.
113
Id. at 1260.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1263.
116
See id. at 1263–64.
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geographic scope and the technological complexity of computer crime,
federal investigators—with national reach and superior resources—may be
better suited for such enforcement than local authorities.
Indeed, Orin Kerr, a leading advocate of a narrow CFAA
interpretation, notes the potential value of a federal law criminalizing
insider digital theft.117 Referring to cases of insider liability, Kerr wrote: “I
don’t think these facts should fit under 18 U.S.C. 1030 because they deal
with a different kind of problem; it’s hard to fit them in to 1030 without
causing incredibly broad liability. But I do think it’s fair to want to
criminalize such conduct with a different statute.”118 Kerr even went so far
as to draft his own potential statute to criminalize insider digital theft,119 and
he defended his draft by arguing that it was “necessary” because courts
have held, as they did in Aleynikov, that the NSPA does not cover digital
information.120 That one of the leading advocates for a narrow CFAA
interpretation thinks that some law criminalizing insider digital theft is
“necessary” demonstrates the strength of the policy arguments in favor of
criminalizing that conduct. But in Part V, this Comment shows that an
entirely new statute is unnecessary to counter Kerr’s fears of CFAA
overbreadth. I advocate for a novel CFAA interpretation that focuses on the
word “obtain” in the definition of “exceed authorized access.” This
interpretation shows that the CFAA, as written, can achieve necessary, but
limited, insider theft liability.
B. CFAA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SHOWS IT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED
TO CRIMINALIZE INSIDER DIGITAL121

The CFAA’s Congressional Reports make clear that one of Congress’s
central purposes in enacting the CFAA was to protect against information
misappropriation. Indeed, while advocates of a narrow interpretation
maintain that the statute is concerned only with access, not misuse, the
entire history of the statute indicates that it was largely driven to combat a

117
Orin Kerr, What About the Insiders? A Second Proposal to Change the Computer
Crime Statutes, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:44 PM), http://goo.gl/3fHUCN.
118
Id.
119
Id.; Orin S. Kerr, 18 U.S.C. 1031, Employee Misuse of Computer Information:
January 22, 2013 Draft, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://goo.gl/ALvt0m (last visited June
2, 2014).
120
Kerr, supra note 117.
121
The 2001 and 2008 amendments do not affect the construction of 1030(a)(2) and are
not discussed here. For a discussion of the effect of those amendments, see Taylor, supra
note 32, at 20708.
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specific misuse: theft.122 CFAA amendments and their corresponding
reports also indicate that Congress intended to expand the Act to cover
insider theft, and that the scope of insider “authorization” is indeed affected
by the purpose of authorization.123
The first version of the CFAA, passed in 1984, was primarily aimed at
“protecting classified information on government computers, as well as
protecting financial records and credit information on government and
financial institution computers.”124 While the computers and information
covered under the CFAA were originally limited, one purpose, even in the
initial bill, was to prevent electronic data theft. A 1984 House Report states
that the proposed legislation was necessary because “[i]t is obvious that
traditional theft/larceny statutes are not the proper vehicles to control the
spate of computer abuse and computer-assisted crimes.”125 As one court
stated, the reason that such statutes were not proper vehicles was because
“they generally do not define property to include electronically processed or
stored data.”126 This was the exact concern discussed previously in Part II.
The 1986 amendments expanded the Act to provide liability for other
forms of fraud and related activities in connection with access to devices
and computers.127
Congress, however, specifically limited such
prohibitions to “Federal interest computers.”128
As the committee
explained, the goal was “to limit Federal jurisdiction over computer crime
to those cases in which there is a compelling Federal interest, i.e., where
computers of the Federal Government or certain financial institutions are
involved, or where the crime itself is interstate in nature.”129 With the
Internet’s advent and expansion, this jurisdictional limitation disappeared as
“almost all computer use has become interstate in nature.”130
While the Act was then limited to such “Federal interest”131
computers, the Senate Reports reveal that the 1986 amendments were
intended to expand the actions covered to allow prosecutors to fit the
122

See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996) (explaining that the legislative intent behind the
passage of the CFAA includes addressing “the problem of computer crime”); see also note
139 and accompanying text.
123
See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
124
Mark D. Weller & Ronald J. Shaffer, Making a Federal Case Out of Employee Theft
of Trade Secrets, 26 ACC DOCKET 96, 98 (2008).
125
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 9 (1984).
126
Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (W.D. Tenn. 2008).
127
See Kerr, supra note 42, at 1629–30.
128
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 10.
129
Id. at 4.
130
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1127 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
131
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 10.
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“square peg of computer fraud into the round hole of theft, embezzlement
or even the illegal conversion of trade secrets.”132
The 1986 amendments also added the key phrase in insider theft
situations“exceeds authorized access”which one commentator has
argued was added to “remedy the misuse-of-legitimate-access problem” in
that the 1984 Act “did not cover individuals who caused harm with
authorized access.”133 In presenting the “exceeds authorized access”
language for a full vote, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted that it
did not intend to extend liability “to any type or form of computer access
that is for a legitimate business purpose. Thus, any access for a legitimate
purpose that is pursuant to an express or implied authorization would not be
affected.”134 This is the most important language from the 1986 House
Report.
The Report does not say that “any access that is pursuant to an express
or implied authorization would not be affected” but rather “any access for a
legitimate purpose that is pursuant to an express or implied authorization
would not be affected.”135 This discussion of the addition of the “exceeds
authorized access” provision demonstrates Congress’s intent to address the
purpose and use of information access by insiders, those who could have a
legitimate purpose for accessing the information, and not simply the access
itself.
The 1996 amendments further broadened the reach of the statute.
Those amendments, among other changes, substituted the phrase “protected
computer” for “federal interest computer.”136 The Senate Report stated the
1996 amendments’ purpose was to broaden the CFAA to “ensure that the
theft of intangible information . . . is prohibited in the same way theft of
physical items are protected.”137 As courts have recognized, the Senate
Report on the 1996 amendments illustrates the broad scope that they were
intended to reach.138 This conclusion is further bolstered by the Report’s
declaration that the CFAA “facilitates addressing in a single statute the
132

Id. at 14 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Hernacki, supra note 111, at 1549.
134
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21 (1984).
135
Id. (emphasis added).
136
See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1128 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (noting Congress intended with the 1996 amendments to
broaden the scope of the CFAA).
137
S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7 (1996) (emphasis added).
138
See Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass.
2009) (“[A] narrow reading of the CFAA ignores the consistent amendments that Congress
has enacted to broaden its application.”); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1129
(noting that the legislative history “demonstrates the broad meaning and intended scope” of
the CFAA terms).
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problem of computer crime, rather than identifying and amending every
potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer
technology.”139
Finally, one section of the Report specifically counters the common
retort that the CFAA should not cover computer theft of information
because other laws exist to combat such theft:
The proposed subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) is intended to protect against the interstate or
foreign theft of information by computer. . . . This subsection would ensure that the
theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in
the same way theft of physical items is protected. In instances where the information
stolen is also copyrighted, the theft may implicate certain rights under the copyright
laws. The crux of the offense under subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), however, is the abuse
of a computer to obtain the information.140

Taken together, this legislative history makes clear that one of the
CFAA’s central purposes is to protect against digital information theft.
Indeed, while advocates of a narrow interpretation maintain that the statute
is concerned only with access, not misuse, the statute’s history indicates
that it was largely driven to combat the specific misuse and theft of
information.
Further, Congress has continually broadened the CFAA’s scope,
expanding it to cover theft by private entities and by not only those outside
the entity (such as hackers) but also by those within the entity (such as
employees).141 In so doing, it identified the purpose as prohibiting
information theft in the same way that tangible property theft is prohibited.
Businesses are protected against employees thieving tangible property that
they are permitted to use for work purposes. Consequently, businesses
should similarly be protected from the theft of information that employees
are permitted to access for work purposes. But even drawing such a parallel
is not necessary. In the Reports concerning the 1986 amendment that added
the “exceeds authorized access” language at issue, Congress made explicit
that the purpose of access is part of the inquiry.142
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S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5.
S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7–8; see also Shurgard Storage Ctrs., 119 F. Supp. 2d at
1128 (declaring this language in the Senate Report to be “dispositive” evidence of the
legislative intent behind the CFAA).
141
Kerr, supra note 42, at 1662 (explaining that Congress’s addition of the “exceeding
authorized access” prohibition was directed at misuse committed by insiders).
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See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
140

624

KEVIN JAKOPCHEK

[Vol. 104

C. CFAA TEXT DEMONSTRATES THAT IT APPLIES TO INSIDER DIGITAL
THEFT

Beyond the policy concerns and legislative history, the idea that the
term “exceeds authorized access” includes liability for insider theft is
supported by the textual incoherence that otherwise results. Proponents of
the narrow interpretation contend that “exceeds authorized access” only
applies to insiders when they employ their authorized use of a computer to
access specific files they are not authorized to access, and that their use of
that information is irrelevant. This interpretation ignores the statutory
definition, effectively rendering “exceeds authorized access” to mean: “to
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to access or
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled to access
or alter.” Such an interpretation cannot stand for three reasons.
First, this is a statute entitled “Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” not
the “Computer Improper Access Act,” and the words “Fraud” and “Abuse”
convey that it is concerned—indeed primarily concerned—with information
use and not its mere access.
Second, the definition of the term reads not just “obtain or alter” but
“so to obtain or alter.” The inclusion of the word “so” implies a concern
with the manner in which data is obtained or altered and not simply with
permission to access data.143 The narrow interpretation simply ignores the
presence of that duly enacted word.144 This ignorance is no mere semantic
detail; the prohibition on “altering” demonstrates that ignoring “so” could
produce absurd results. Take, for example, an employee who is authorized
to access a spreadsheet only to input data and, in an act of sabotage, deletes
the entire spreadsheet. By virtue of her authorization to input data, that
employee is entitled to “alter” the spreadsheet. If we ignore the word “so,”
we ignore the limited manner in which the employee is entitled to alter the
data. Thus, the narrow interpretation discarding of the word “so” means
any minimal authorization to alter data gives carte blanche for all
alterations, including sabotage and destruction.
Third, it is contrary to the entire statute’s text to read “obtain” to mean
“access.” The CFAA as a whole uses the word “access,” or a derivative
thereof, eighteen times—four times in the very definition at issue.145 If the
143
See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 676 F.3d 854
(2012) (en banc).
144
Id. at 785–86.
145
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (using the word “access” or a derivative thereof twice in
subsection (a)(1), twice in subsection (a)(2), twice in subsection (a)(3), twice in subsection
(a)(4), once in subsection (a)(5)(B), once in subsection (a)(5)(C), once in subsection (a)(6),
once in subsection (a)(7)(A), four times in subsection (e)(6), and twice in subsection
(e)(10)).
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drafters intended “obtain” to mean “access,” they would have simply used
the word one more time.
Fourth, the additional prohibition on altering information also serves to
further elucidate the impropriety of conflating “obtain” with “access.”146 In
order to alter information, one must access it first. Thus, the narrow
interpretation’s conflation of “obtain” with “access” renders the word
“alter” redundant; if the initial access violates the statute, it does so
regardless of what is done with that information. For a theory whose merit
lies in its “textual” approach, the narrow interpretation’s credibility is
undermined by these inconsistencies.
D. CURRENT BROAD LIABILITY THEORIES ARE ALSO FLAWED

The narrow interpretation’s flaws do not mean, however, that its
criticisms of the broad theories are unfounded. Indeed, as currently applied,
the theories supporting broad interpretation are themselves untenable.
The law of agency as a means of determining employee liability is
vague and malleable.147 For instance, it is uncertain how “adverse” an
interest must be to result in a breach of loyalty that would lead to CFAA
liability.148 Numerous other questions also remain. For example, what
about interests that may not be parallel to the employer’s but are not
directly adverse? What if an employee is retrieving information for his own
personal purposes but is not using it to the detriment of the employer?
Does accessing the Internet to waste time while on the clock violate the
duty of loyalty and revoke an employee’s authorization? Can loyalty be
restored after it is breached? Can permission to access information be
restored after it is implicitly revoked? Is it fair to give someone explicit
permission to do something and then implicitly revoke that permission
without express notice? While the law of agency provides answers to these
questions, the more salient point is—are employees (or employers) aware of
those answers? As one student note put it, “[b]road interpretations,
including those that would find liability for . . . breaches of agency law

146

See id. § 1030(e)(6).
See Field, supra note 42, at 843.
148
Id. at 844 (“A court could determine either that acquiring any adverse interest to his
employer left him without authorization, or it could find that the employee’s actions did not
constitute a serious enough breach of loyalty to find a termination of authorization. Both
outcomes are arguably allowable under section 112 [of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency] . . . .”).
147
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duties, raise significant problems of overbreadth and vagueness
necessitating a more narrowly-tailored approach.”149
Contract theory also has the potential to lead to unfair and unintended
CFAA prosecutions. As the Nosal court pointed out:
Minds have wandered since the beginning of time and the computer gives employees
new ways to procrastinate, by g-chatting with friends, playing games, shopping or
watching sports highlights. Such activities are routinely prohibited by many
computer-use policies . . . . [U]nder the broad interpretation of the CFAA, such minor
dalliances would become federal crimes.150

Some may respond that such an argument is a mere technicality and rely on
prosecutorial discretion to prevent such charges. The Nosal court addressed
that argument as well, stating, “[w]hile it’s unlikely that you'll be
prosecuted for watching Reason.TV on your work computer, you could be.
Employers wanting to rid themselves of troublesome employees without
following proper procedures could threaten to report them to the FBI unless
they quit. Ubiquitous, seldom-prosecuted crimes invite arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.”151 A federal circuit court adopting the current
broad interpretations, then, could invite arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.
Further, broad interpretation supported by contract theory could
potentially lead to prosecutions for violating websites’ terms of service.152
Given that the vast majority of online services have “clickable” terms of
service agreements that are pages long and are rarely read, people may
unwittingly expose themselves to criminal liability for innocuous actions
that they have no idea are prohibited.153 The Nosal court cited one
example: most social media websites have terms of service that prohibit
lying. But “[l]ying on social media websites is common: People shave
years off their age, add inches to their height and drop pounds from their
weight.”154 Such lies may seem innocuous, but “[t]he difference between
puffery and prosecution may depend on whether you happen to be someone
[a federal prosecutor] has reason to go after.”155

149
Hernacki, supra note 111, at 1564 (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 1568
(criticizing the agency approach for interpreting “exceeds authorized access” in a way that
implicates unconstitutional vagueness).
150
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
151
Id.
152
Kerr, supra note 42, at 1600 (explaining that “[a]n example [of a violation under
contract theory] would be use that violates the Terms of Service that an ISP imposes on its
customers”).
153
See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860–62.
154
Id. at 862.
155
Id.
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These concerns are not hypothetical. In United States v. Drew, Lori
Drew was prosecuted under the CFAA on the theory that the fake profile
she created violated MySpace’s terms of service.156 Drew created the fake
profile to start an “insult” war to bully one of her seventh grade daughter’s
classmates.157 Creation of the fake profile, according to the prosecution,
violated the website’s terms of service and meant that Drew had “exceeded
authorized access,” violating the CFAA.158 While Drew’s actions and
motivations may have been despicable, Congress passed the CFAA to
protect digital property rights, not prevent cyber-bullying. If the theory is
that the breach of terms of service creates the CFAA violation, then the
breach of any terms of service agreement would lead to the same result,
even those breaches much more innocuous than Drew’s.159
V. THE “OBTAIN” THEORY
The circuit split is focused on the merits of the narrow interpretation or
the broad interpretations.160 But there lies another path. It provides liability
for insider theft, like the broad interpretations, while accounting for
concerns of overbreadth that motivate use of the narrow interpretation. This
approach contends, unlike the narrow interpretation, that the CFAA does
inherently contain restrictions on information use. Unlike the current broad
interpretations, this approach argues that the CFAA itself limits the scope of
use restrictions. Indeed, this Comment submits that the statute contains two
specific use restrictions: the prohibitions on “altering” and “obtaining.”161
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United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 457 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[A] central question
[in the prosecution] is whether a computer user’s intentional violation of one or more
provisions in an Internet website’s terms of services (where those terms condition access to
and/or use of the website’s services upon agreement to and compliance with the terms)
satisfies the first element of section 1030(a)(2)(C).”).
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See id. at 452; see also Nicholas R. Johnson, Note, “I Agree” to Criminal Liability:
Lori Drew’s Prosecution Under § 1030(A)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and
Why Every Internet User Should Care, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 561, 561–65.
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See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 457.
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Drew was convicted on the CFAA charge, id. at 453, but the conviction was
dismissed post-verdict by Central District of California Judge George H. Wu, who held that
the conviction violated void-for-vagueness doctrine. Id. at 467–68. The important point,
though, is that prosecutors operating under a contract theory could, and in fact did, bring
CFAA charges against someone for creating a fake profile.
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Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (“We remain unpersuaded by the decisions of our sister
circuits that interpret the CFAA broadly to cover violations of corporate computer use
restrictions or violations of a duty of loyalty.” (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d
1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); and Int’l Airport
Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006))).
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See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
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In fact, in patterns involving insider theft, the overlooked “obtain”
restriction is key.
The CFAA defines “exceeds authorized access” to mean to “access a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or
alter.”162 As argued earlier, the narrow interpretation effectively ignores the
word “so” and equates “obtain” with “access.”163
Consider again an employee who has permission to use a computer
and permission to access a given file. He e-mails the file to his personal email address for the purpose of launching competition with his employer.
According to the narrow interpretation, no violation has occurred because
the employee had permission to access and use the information for his
employment.164 But the statute does not prohibit accessing information that
the accesser is not entitled to access or alter. It prohibits obtaining
information the obtainer is not so entitled to obtain or alter.
Instead of counterintuitively assigning “obtain” the meaning of
“access,” courts should take the approach ostensibly favored by those who
advocate the narrow approach—interpreting the statute based on the plain
meaning of its words. The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “obtain” as
“to gain or get (something) usually by effort.”165 Black’s Law Dictionary
does not define “obtain” but does define “acquire” as “to gain possession or
control of; to get or obtain.”166 The Law Dictionary, meanwhile, defines
“obtain” as “[t]o acquire; to get hold of by effort; to get and retain
possession of.”167 All these definitions seem to imply a more permanent act
than mere transitory access. While an employee may very well be
authorized to access information, the grant of access does not mean the
employee is authorized to permanently acquire the information. If
prosecutors and courts give “obtain” its plain meaning, then an employee
violates the statute once he uses authorized access to personally acquire or,
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“gain control of,” information he is not “so entitled” to “acquire or, gain
control of.”
This interpretation is consistent with the statute’s intent to create laws
analogous to theft and trespass that can be applied to the digital world. For
instance, an employee may be entitled to use a piece of a company’s
physical property, and even to take that property home with her, but that
does not permit her to permanently acquire it. The distinction between this
scenario and digital theft is that a true owner is not deprived of the
electronic files.168
That distinction is precisely why traditional property laws failed in
their application to digital information and precisely the reason for which
specialized computer abuse laws were enacted.169 Giving plain meaning to
the term “obtain,” a court should interpret the statute to bar digital
information theft by defining the CFAA from the perspective of the
violator, acquiring something he is not entitled to acquire, as opposed to the
true owner, losing a property interest. It would thus not only be consistent
with goals articulated in the specific legislative history of the CFAA but
with the key motivation for computer misuse statutes in general.
Further, this plain language definition of “obtain” resolves the textual
incoherency in the narrow interpretation. As previously discussed, the
narrow approach conflates the meaning of “obtain” with “access,” even
though the drafters used the word “access” throughout the statute when they
intended that meaning. Also, interpreting “obtain” to mean “access” makes
the inclusion of “alter” redundant. If “obtain” had its plain meaning—
“acquisition”—there were would be no redundancy; rather, the statute
would prohibit two separate, specific uses of information: misappropriation
and unauthorized alteration. This interpretation is consistent with the plain
language definition, the language chosen throughout the statute, and the
purpose of computer misuse legislation. Moreover, it leads to results
consistent with the intent of the legislature.
By recognizing some liability for misuse, this interpretation gives
meaning to the word “so” in “so entitled.” It imposes liability on the
employee who, while authorized to alter a database to input information,
sabotages and destroys the database. Now, under the “obtain” theory, the
scope of “so entitled” still must be defined. Here, the principles of the
contract and agency theories are useful but with an important limitation: not
every violation of contract or agency amounts to a CFAA violation; rather,
only those actions that can be construed as “acquiring” or “altering”
information constitute violations. Gone are the murkier grounds of minor
168
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violations of computer-use policies (such as personal web surfing) or terms
of service.
Still unresolved is the criticism that the contract and agency theories
import principles extrinsic to the statute’s text.170 Ultimately, though, this
criticism falls flat. Congress chose the phrase “so entitled” without further
definition. As the narrow interpretation argues, words should take their
common meaning, and law regarding contract and agency does indeed
commonly define the scope of what employees are allowed to do. Where
authorization is explicit, such as in an employment contract, the explicitly
defined scope should govern.
Oftentimes, employees’ authorization to act is not explicit but implicit.
In the employment context, however, the law of agency is the very thing
that defines the scope of implicit authorization. Congress knew that and
chose not to provide any contrary definition. Without the bounds of agency
law, any implicit authorization to access information becomes a blanket
authorization of access and use. Further, in the context of implicit
authorization, it is the potential violator who is asking the court to infer the
existence of authorization. Since it is to the violator’s benefit to make the
inference that authorization exists at all, it is only fair to also allow an
inference as to the scope of that authorization.
The important distinction is that while the “obtain” interpretation
theory may still incorporate extrinsic bodies of law, it limits the influence of
that extrinsic law based on the words of the CFAA itself. The CFAA would
not be violated every time people exceed the access authorized by their
employment contracts or agency relationships. Rather, insiders would only
violate the CFAA by obtaining or altering information that their agency or
contracts did not so entitle them to obtain or alter.
Of course, because of the nature of digital information, it is hard to
define when information is being merely accessed as opposed to obtained.
Nevertheless, using the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word
“acquire,” it becomes fair to say that information is “obtained” when the
user maintains “control over” the information or the ability to access the
information even after authorization has expired.171 For instance, when an
employee e-mails proprietary information to a personal e-mail address, he
creates a way of accessing the information independent of the access
granted by the information owner. This definition is consistent with the
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See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009)
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point raised above that, in terms of digital misappropriation, theft is defined
not as the loss of property interest by the true owner, but the illegitimate
gain of such an interest by the acquirer.
This definition raises a potential question in regards to a common
factual situation: what happens when an employee transmits information to
a personal e-mail or computer for the purpose of working from home, but
later uses that information for other purposes? The answer, again, lies in
the definition of “exceeds authorized access.” The prohibition is not merely
on “obtaining information” but “obtaining or altering information that the
accesser is not entitled to so obtain or alter.”172 The use of “so” indicates
that the entitlement to obtain or alter can be conditioned.173 If the employer
has imposed no restraint on the information, no violation has occurred. If,
however, the employer has made clear that it is the owner of property, and
that any “control over” information is allowed only for the purposes of
working from home, then the employee is not entitled to control it for other
purposes. When the employee pursues other purposes, he asserts control
over information in a way that he is not entitled to and thus violates the
CFAA.
A potential criticism of the “obtain theory” is that the misappropriation
of information may already be actionable. As Aleynikov illustrates, though,
a federal cause of action is not always available.174 Further, the information
that is worth protecting because of privacy concerns may not reach the level
of trade secrets protected by state law.175 Even if other actions were
available, Congress addressed in debate over the CFAA the potential of
duplicative liability.176 Such concerns were dismissed, though, as the
statute was passed with the congressional reports noting that while the theft
may implicate other rights, under the CFAA “the crux of the offense . . . is
the abuse of a computer to obtain the information.”177
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CONCLUSION
The CFAA is designed to update property protections for the changing
conditions of the modern world. Traditional laws of trespass, burglary, and
larceny were not sufficient to address issues of computer misuse.
Traditional trespass and burglary laws require a physical invasion that
simply does not occur in the world of digital trespass. Theft laws, too, are
insufficient due to their reliance on the victim’s loss of a property right.
When digital information is stolen, it is almost always copied and extracted,
leaving the original owner with the same information as before the theft.
Congress enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and its
amendments to directly combat the insufficiencies of existing law.
Together, they were meant to protect computer owners from threats ranging
from hacking, to denial-of-service attacks, to destructive worms or viruses,
to information theft. Indeed, information theft is directly mentioned
multiple times in the legislative history of both the original 1984 CFAA and
its subsequent amendments. Further, Congress drew an explicit distinction
in that the Act’s legislative history between theft that occurs by outsiders,
hacking into systems, and theft that occurs by insiders, abusing their
privileges to access information.178
It is not only good policy to combat both sorts of misconduct—insider
and outsider theft—the CFAA legislative history indicates that combating
such misconduct was the intent of the statute. That intent is manifest in the
alternative prohibitions on accessing computers “without authorization” or
“in excess” of authorization.” However, circuit courts have split into two
broad camps regarding the exact nature of insider misconduct prohibited by
the statute. The narrow interpretation camp maintains that the prohibition
only refers to information within a system that an insider does not have
explicit authorization to access. To those in the narrow camp, “exceeding
authorized access” only occurs when an insider is allowed to access a
computer, but hacks into files to which authorization does not extend. The
broad interpretation camps maintain that exceeding authorized access refers
not just to the situations discussed above, but also to situations in which an
employee accesses information that she is authorized to access but does so
for purposes that violate her authorization.
The broad interpretation contains two subsets: agency theory and
contract theory. Agency theory maintains that when an agent acts upon
interests adverse to her principal, the authorization associated with the
principal–agent relationship is revoked. Contract theory maintains that the
scope of employees’ authorization can be, and is, limited by the defined
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prohibitions in their contracts. If employees access information in violation
of those contract provisions, their access is unauthorized and violates the
CFAA.
The narrow and broad interpretations each have their advantages. The
narrow interpretation creates a bright-line rule to easily identify prohibited
conduct, and relies on the text of the statute, rather than any extrinsic law,
for its basis. The broad interpretation and both of its supporting theories
seem to better cover the spirit of the law, but extend liability beyond
improper access to misuse (or abuse) of information. These theories extend
liability to insider theft of information that employees have permission to
access, which reaches a result seemingly consistent with the legislative
history and intent.
All three of these approaches also have drawbacks. The narrow theory
does not extend to situations that the CFAA is intended to cover. Under
that theory, as long as an accesser has permission to access a specific piece
of information, no action taken with that information violates the CFAA. In
contrast, the broad theories both have little grounding in statutory text and
are potentially dangerous due to their abilities to be overly broad.
A novel approach, however, is consistent with the text of the statute,
extending liability to insider theft without posing the potential of overbroad
prosecution. Without utilizing extrinsic principles, the very text of the
statute identifies two specific improper uses—“obtaining” or “altering”
information in a way that is not entitled. If the term “obtain” were given its
plain meaning of “acquisition,” then the CFAA by its terms would indeed
extend criminal liability for insider theft. This approach is consistent with
the purposes of computer misuse statutes as it resolves the difficulties
relating to victims’ lost property interests. Instead of focusing on the
owner’s deprived property interest, it focuses on the thief, who acquires
something to which he is not entitled.
Not only is this interpretation consistent with the policy goals behind
computer misuse statutes. It is also consistent with the specific legislative
history of the CFAA. That history identifies theft and insider theft as a
concern with which the Act is addressed. Like the broader theories, the
“obtain” theory extends coverage to such conduct. Unlike those theories,
however, it does not pose the potential of overbroad applications because it
specifically limits liability to the two enumerated misuses: unentitled
“altering” and “obtaining.”
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